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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 
(SEPTA) refused to display an advertisement stating that 
"Women Who Choose Abortion Suffer More & Deadlier 
Breast Cancer." We must decide in this appeal whether, in 
doing so, SEPTA, a regional transportation authority, 
violated the First Amendment rights of the advertiser, 
Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. (CBM). The district court 
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found, after conducting a bench trial, that the First 
Amendment was not violated because the advertising space 
at issue did not constitute a public forum and because 
SEPTA acted reasonably in removing the posters. We do not 
agree with either conclusion. In light of the other 
advertisements, including those relating to abortion, which 
SEPTA had previously permitted to run on its property, and 
in light of SEPTA's own purposes in using and leasing the 
space, we have determined that SEPTA intended to create 
a designated public forum. We find that SEPTA's action in 
removing the posters does not survive the strict scrutiny 
applied to speech within the parameters of a designated 
public forum; nor does it pass the reasonableness test 
applied where property of a governmental agency has not 




SEPTA is an "agency and instrumentality" of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 74 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 1502. It operates buses, subways, and regional rail lines 
in and around the City of Philadelphia. SEPTA contracts 
with a licensee, Transportation Display's Inc. (TDI), for the 
construction and sale of advertising space in its stations 
and in and on its vehicles. TDI and SEPTA are the 
defendants in this case. 
 
The plaintiff, CBM, began a public service campaign in 
1995 to inform the public of what it believes to be the 
increased risk of breast cancer for women who have had 
abortions. As part of this campaign, CBM sought to display 
posters in train and subway stations and on buses and at 
bus stops in major urban areas, including Baltimore, 
Washington, and Philadelphia. 
 
CBM contacted SEPTA in late November 1995 about 
placing posters in the Philadelphia area transit system. 
SEPTA referred CBM to TDI. Bradley Thomas, president of 
CBM, subsequently spoke with Robert R. Meara, Vice 
President and Regional Manager at TDI. In December 1995, 
Thomas sent a draft poster to TDI for review by Meara and 
SEPTA. The poster stated "Women Who Choose Abortion 
Suffer More & Deadlier Breast Cancer." The district court 
described the poster as "graphically designed with bold 
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white lettering on a background of black and bright red, 
except that the word `deadlier' was written in red." The 
poster also included a 1-800 number for information which 
connected callers not with CBM but with an organization 
called the American Rights Coalition (ARC). 
 
SEPTA requested that the poster better identify the 
sponsor, CBM. CBM complied and added a description of 
CBM: "Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. is a charitable, 
religious, educational, non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. 
CBM, P.O. Box 22 Merrifield, VA 22116. (703) 598-2226." 
SEPTA then approved the posters for display. 
 
On January 15, 1996, the posters went up. TDI put two 
of them next to overhead clocks in Suburban Station in 
Philadelphia, and 24 others in subway and railroad stations 
in Philadelphia and its suburbs. SEPTA immediately began 
receiving what it described as "numerous" complaints about 
the poster, which included "rider protest" and"criticism" by 
"women's health organizations" and "local government 
officials." Shortly thereafter, Robert Meara told CBM that 
SEPTA wanted CBM to identify itself more prominently on 
the posters. CBM accordingly added decals to the signs that 
identified and described CBM with larger and bolder type. 
 
After the posters were installed, TDI faxed to CBM a 
contract, which Thomas signed and returned to TDI, also 
via fax. The contract was signed by Robert Meara of TDI 
and dated January 22, 1996. The contract provided that 
46<!DAG> x 60<!DAG> posters would be displayed at 24 locations in rail 
stations for one year. The contract also stated that during 
that year two 21<!DAG> x 62<!DAG> signs would be displayed on clocks 
at Suburban Station. The monthly charge for the signs on 
the clocks was $642.60, while the monthly charge for the 
24 other posters was $2400. There were "terms and 
conditions" on the back of the contract, including one that 
stated "if the Transportation Facility concerned should 
deem such advertising objectionable for any reason, TDI 
shall have the right to terminate the contract and 
discontinue the service without notice." 
 
In early February, SEPTA received a copy of a letter 
written by Dr. Philip Lee, Assistant Secretary of Health in 
the United States Department of Health and Human 
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Services. The letter was not addressed to anyone in SEPTA, 
but instead to Lawrence Reuter, General Manager of the 
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, where 
CBM's posters were also displayed. Dr. Lee wrote to Reuter 
that 
 
       It has recently come to my attention that the Metro 
       Transit System has posted more than 1,100 free public 
       service ads from the Christ's Bride Ministries. The ad 
       states: "Women who choose abortion suffer more & 
       deadlier breast cancer. Information: 1-800-634-2224." 
       This ad is unfortunately misleading, unduly alarming, 
       and does not accurately reflect the weight of the 
       scientific literature. 
 
Dr. Lee went on to state that in his opinion the studies 
showing a link between breast cancer and abortion suffered 
from methodological weaknesses, that there was no 
consensus on the purported relationship between breast 
cancer and abortion, and that Dr. Lee knew of no evidence 
supporting the claim that abortion causes "deadlier" breast 
cancer. Dr. Lee also complained that callers to the 1-800 
number were referred to an article in the Journal of the 
National Cancer Institute, describing a study that suggested 
a positive correlation between induced abortions and breast 
cancer. Dr. Lee noted that although the article did appear 
in the Journal, the Journal also published an editorial 
stating that the results were not "conclusive." Finally, Dr. 
Lee expressed concern that callers to the 1-800 number 
were being asked to participate in a survey and that callers 
could become confused and think that the National Cancer 
Institute supported the survey, which it did not. 
 
Based on Dr. Lee's letter, SEPTA removed the posters on 
February 16, 1996. According to the testimony of Mr. 
Gambaccini, SEPTA's General Manager, the "heart" of the 
decision to remove them was the questions about their 
accuracy. The 1-800 number concerns were an "ancillary" 
consideration. It is uncontested that no one at SEPTA or 
TDI conducted any other inquiry into the accuracy of the 
message on the poster, or contacted CBM for information 
that would support the claim made by the ad, or informed 
CBM of SEPTA's objections to the ad before removing the 
posters. 
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On March 13, 1996, nearly a month later, Meara of TDI 
wrote to Thomas of CBM, explaining that the posters had 
been removed on February 16. Meara stated in his letter 
that the decision had been made by SEPTA as a result of "a 
letter from the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services in which it concluded that the ad was 
`unfortunately misleading, unduly alarming and does not 
accurately reflect the weight of the scientific literature'." TDI 
included a check to CBM for $3,042.60 for the "unused 
portion" of the contract. CBM had paid a total of $6,086 for 
two months of advertising. 
 
CBM filed suit on May 10, 1996, naming SEPTA and TDI 
as defendants. The complaint alleged violations of CBM's 
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 
also alleged breach of contract. CBM sought compensatory 
damages and declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. SS 1983, 1985(c) and 1986.1 The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
conducted a three-day bench trial in June 1996. The court 
heard testimony about SEPTA's and TDI's policies and 
practices regarding advertising space on SEPTA property, 
as well as testimony from experts about the alleged link 
between breast cancer and induced abortions. 
 
During the trial, three experts testified that the existing 
studies and research do not support the existence of a 
cause and effect relationship between abortion and breast 
cancer. These experts did, however, acknowledge that some 
studies show a weak "association" between induced 
abortions and breast cancer. One of SEPTA's experts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. CBM has not appealed the district court's rejections of its claims 
under 42 U.S.C. SS 1985 and 1986. CBM has, however, objected to the 
district court's denial of its breach of contract claim. It argues that it 
only received one page of the two page contract and that there was no 
"meeting of the minds" as to the terms of the contract between it and 
TDI. The complaint does not make this allegation, however. CBM also 
attached both pages of the contract to the complaint and relied on 
language from the allegedly missing second page in the complaint itself. 
CBM also argues that the contract is "unconscionable," although the 
complaint makes no such allegations. We reject these claims as being 
without merit. 
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testified that the better studies have not been consistent 
and that some studies show no link at all. 
 
CBM's expert, on the other hand, testified that he had 
analyzed 23 epidemiological studies, 12 of which, in his 
opinion, showed a statistically significant increase in breast 
cancer among women who had undergone induced 
abortions. He argued that this risk could not be accounted 
for by the presence of other variables, such as age or 
family. The increased risk, CBM's expert noted, was greater 
than the relative risk associated with oral contraceptives. 
Because manufacturers of contraceptives alert the public as 
to the possible link between their product and breast 
cancer, it should not be "unduly alarming" for CBM to 
report a slightly greater risk purportedly associated with 
induced abortions. 
 
The district court issued an opinion on August 16, 1996, 
holding for the defendants on all counts. The court 
reasoned that public transit stations do not constitute 
traditional public fora and that SEPTA and TDI had not 
created a public forum because they maintained control 
over the use of the advertising space. The court also found 
that Dr. Lee's letter was a "reasonable" basis on which to 
remove the advertisement. The court commented that 
"ultimately a consensus may develop" as to the link 
between breast cancer and abortion but "at this time we do 
not know." The court did not decide whether either SEPTA's 
or CBM's experts were "right." 
 
CBM timely appealed to this Court. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
In evaluating the claim that CBM's First Amendment 
rights have been violated, we have a "constitutional duty to 
conduct an independent examination of the record as a 
whole, without deference to the trial court." Hurley v. Irish- 
American Gay Group of Boston, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 2344 
(1995). This independent duty does not extend to the 
district court's rulings on matters of credibility, to which we 
continue to defer, id. (citing Harte-Hanks Communications, 
Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989)), but it does 
require us draw our own inferences from the factual 
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evidence presented. United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 
1357 (3d Cir. 1994); Swineford v. Snyder Co. Pa., 15 F.3d 
1258, 1165 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
III. State Action and Commercial Speech 
 
Turning to the substantive issues, we readily dispose of 
two initial matters. First, the United States Constitution 
guarantees freedom of expression only against infringement 
by the state, not by private actors. Hurley v. Irish-American 
Gay Group of Boston, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 2344 (1995). In this 
case, however, the parties agree that SEPTA is a state 
actor, as is its licensee, TDI, and that their actions are 
constrained by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
Second, the posters come within the ambit of speech fully 
protected by the First Amendment. The defendants argue 
that because callers to the 1-800 number listed on the 
poster may receive information advertising the services of 
medical malpractice attorneys, CBM's message is thereby 
transformed into "commercial speech," and should receive 
substantially less constitutional protection. See Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). But 
the speech at issue does not advertise goods or services, 
nor does it refer to a specific product or service. The 1-800 
number listed on the poster does not even connect callers 
to CBM. Any economic motive of CBM for posting the 
advertisement is very attenuated at best. See U.S. 
Healthcare v. Blue Cross of Gr. Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 
932-933 (3d Cir. 1990). The speech involved is accordingly 
not "commercial," at least in the sense that it is afforded 
less protection under the First Amendment. 
 
IV. Public Forum 
 
The government may, as a general rule, limit speech that 
takes place on its own property without running afoul of 
the First Amendment. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches 
Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993); Perry 
Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 
46 (1983). Where, however, the property in question is 
either a traditional public forum or a forum designated as 
public by the government, the government's ability to limit 
speech is impinged upon by the First Amendment. Perry, 
460 U.S. at 45-46. In either a traditional or a designated 
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public forum, the government's content-based restrictions 
on private speech must survive strict scrutiny to pass 
constitutional muster. Id.; International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). The 
government has, however, a far broader license to curtail 
speech if the forum has not been opened to the type of 
expression in question. In such a case, the government's 
restrictions need only be viewpoint neutral and"reasonable 
in light of the purpose served by the forum." Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S.Ct. 2510, 
2516-2517 (1995) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)); 
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town of Morristown, 958 
F.2d 1242, 1262 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
In order to decide whether a public forum is involved 
here, we must first determine the nature of the property 
and the extent of its use for speech. The Supreme Court 
wrestled with a similar question in Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985), 
when it considered whether legal defense funds could be 
excluded from a charity drive among federal employees. The 
government argued in Cornelius that the"federal 
workplace" was the relevant forum. The plaintiffs on the 
other hand maintained that the forum consisted only of the 
charity drive itself. Id. at 800. The Court defined the forum 
in terms of the access sought by the plaintiff. It accordingly 
rejected the view that the entire workplace was the proper 
forum, because the plaintiffs sought only to join the charity 
drive, not to engage in actual, face-to-face solicitation in the 
workplace. Id. at 801. The Court went on to conclude that 
the charity drive itself did not constitute a public forum 
and that the restrictions on participation were reasonable. 
 
In this case, the district court variously defined the forum 
at issue as "the stations in a public transit system," a 
"public transportation system," and "SEPTA's subway and 
rail stations and their advertising space." Applying the 
reasoning of Cornelius, we look to the access sought by 
CBM. CBM did not seek to leaflet, demonstrate, or solicit in 
the rail and subway stations as a whole. Instead, it sought 
access only to the advertising space leased out by SEPTA, 
through TDI. The contract between the parties 
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contemplated advertising with posters in the stations and 
next to the clocks at Suburban Station in Philadelphia. We 
conclude, therefore, that the forum at issue is SEPTA's 
advertising space. See, Airline Pilots Assoc. v. Dept. of 
Aviation of the City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144, 1151 (7th Cir. 
1995) (holding that display diorama in airport, not entire 
concourse, constituted relevant forum); Lebron v. Nat'l. R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d 650, 655-656 (holding that one 
billboard was the relevant forum, not the entire Penn 
Station); New York Magazine v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 
136 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that because 
MTA allowed both commercial and political speech, the 
outside of MTA buses is a designated public forum).2 
 
Our next step is to decide whether SEPTA's advertising 
space is a public forum. It clearly does not constitute a 
"traditional" public forum, archetypal examples of which 
include streets and parks. These areas have been"held in 
the public trust," Lee, 505 U.S. at 680, and dedicated to 
expressive activity for "time out of mind." Id. (quoting 
Hauge Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 
515 (1939)). We agree with the district court that the 
advertising space in the stations is not a traditional public 
forum. We do not understand CBM to argue otherwise. 
 
More difficult is the question whether SEPTA has created 
a designated public forum by "expressly" dedicating its 
advertising space to "speech activity." U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 
U.S. 720, 726-727 (1990) (plurality opinion). A designated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The parties have not argued that the relevant forum is actually just 
advertising space in the stations, to the exclusion of space leased on and 
inside SEPTA vehicles. Because SEPTA stated that it used different 
standards in evaluating advertisements that appeared as wrap-around 
bus ads, one could conclude that these types of ads are a separate 
forum. See Lebron, 69 F.3d at 655 (one billboard, not all of the 
billboards 
in Penn Station, constituted the relevant forum because the billboard 
was unique and the speaker sought access only to that specific 
billboard), but see Lebron, 69 F.3d at 661 (Newman, C.J. dissenting) 
(arguing that "public forum analysis cannot be so particularized as to 
focus on one of several billboards on government property"). Whether we 
consider the limitations on wrap-around bus ads as creating a separate 
forum, or merely a particular limitation within the larger forum of 
SEPTA's advertising space, our disposition of the case remains the same. 
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public forum is created because the government so intends. 
Inaction does not make such a forum; neither does the 
allowance of "limited discourse." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
We accordingly look to the authority's intent with regard to 
the forum in question and ask whether SEPTA clearly and 
deliberately opened its advertising space to the public. 
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 269- 
270 (1988); Perry, 460 U.S. at 37. To gauge SEPTA's intent, 
we examine its policies and practices in using the space 
and also the nature of the property and its compatibility 
with expressive activity. Gregoire v. Centennial School 
District, 907 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802); Brody v. Sugzdinis, 957 F.2d 
1108, 1117 (3d Cir. 1992). Restrictions on the use of the 
forum, however, do not necessarily mean that SEPTA has 
not created a public forum. They may demonstrate instead 
that SEPTA intended to create a limited public forum, open 
only to certain kinds of expression. See, e.g., Kreimer, 958 
F.2d at 1261 (public library constituted a limited public 
forum for "reading, writing and quiet contemplation," but 
not for "oral and interactive" First Amendment activities); 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 
S.Ct. 2510, 2517 (1995) (student activities fund, available 
to student groups meeting certain criteria, constituted 
limited public forum). 
 
       A. SEPTA's policies 
 
We will look first at the purpose for which SEPTA uses 
the space in question. The main function of the advertising 
space at issue is to earn a profit for SEPTA. Although 
SEPTA generates approximately 99.5% of its revenues 
through the operation of the public transit system, it does 
derive about one half of one percent of its operating budget 
from the leasing of advertising space in its stations and in 
and on its vehicles. The contract between TDI and SEPTA 
states that "it is understood that it is Licensee's obligations 
[sic] under the terms of this contract to produce revenues 
. . .."3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. That the generation of income is a goal of the advertising space is 
also 
reflected in the manner in which SEPTA is paid by TDI under the 
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The record shows that TDI and SEPTA also had a 
secondary goal in using the space: promoting "awareness" 
of social issues and "providing a catalyst for change." These 
objectives are stated in the "TDI Cares" brochure. The "TDI 
Cares" program, in which SEPTA participates, seeks to 
" `give back' to the communities which[TDI] serve[s] in 
many ways . . .." In this program TDI picks an issue of 
public concern and then pays for the materials and labor 
involved in creating the advertisements. The purpose of the 
program, in TDI's words, is to assail TDI markets with 
"images, both poignant and creative, which are designed to 
elevate awareness and provide a catalyst for change." This 
page of the brochure is headed "consciousness" and states 
that the program tries to "focus consciousness on an issue 
of pressing human concern." The testimony at trial was 
that SEPTA participated in TDI's annual campaign by 
donating unsold advertising space. SEPTA and TDI "jointly 
agree" on what initiatives will run in the Philadelphia area, 
but it is not clear from the record which ads ran on SEPTA 
property under this program.4 
 
SEPTA argues that where the government runs a 
commercial operation, a "bright-line rule" directs that no 
public forum has been created. For this proposition, SEPTA 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
contract. TDI guarantees a minimum annual payment to SEPTA, one 
twelfth of which is due at the beginning of each month, but SEPTA 
receives fifty-five percent of all net sales in any given month if that 
amount is greater than one twelfth of the guaranteed annual payment. 
In the first agreement year, the guaranteed annual payment was 
$2,000,000. This rose to $2,950,000 for the fifth and final agreement 
year. 
 
4. SEPTA contends that we should not consider the TDI Cares brochure 
because it is hearsay. The brochure was, however, admitted into 
evidence without objection by SEPTA. Moreover, it was offered not for the 
truth of the matter asserted but for the fact that the assertions were 
made -- which is not hearsay. In addition, the brochure plays little role 
in our decision. There is no evidence on the record of which ads actually 
ran in the campaigns described in the brochure or of how much 
advertising space SEPTA and/or TDI actually donated to those 
campaigns. Considered with the other evidence in the record, the 
brochure demonstrates, however, that the forum in question is suitable 
for speech concerning social problems and issues. 
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cites International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. 
Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992). In Lee, the Court considered 
restrictions on solicitation and leafleting in airport 
terminals. The Court began by noting that the government 
owned and operated the airport terminals and that: 
 
       Where the government is acting as a proprietor, 
       managing its internal operations, rather than acting as 
       a lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its 
       actions will not be subjected to the heightened review 
       to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject. 
 
505 U.S. at 678 (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 
720, 725 (1990) (plurality opinion) (citing Cafeteria & 
Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 866, 896 (1961))). 
 
In Lee, the Court went on, however, to apply the factors 
identified in Cornelius to determine whether the airport 
terminals were public fora. The Court reasoned that the 
city's purpose in operating the airport was to generate a 
profit by serving the air-traveling public. The goal of the 
terminal was "the facilitation of passenger air travel" and 
not "the promotion of expression." 505 U.S. at 682. The 
Court distinguished the restricted access in air terminals 
from other "transportation nodes," such as rail and bus 
stations. Id. at 681. 
 
We do not read Lee, as SEPTA suggests, to mean that 
every time the government runs a commercial enterprise it 
has, by definition, decided not to create an open forum. To 
the contrary, it is the commercial and restricted nature of 
an airport concourse which suggested that the government 
did not intend the concourse to be primarily a forum for 
expression. See also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800. 
 
Here, we have determined that the forum is not the 
SEPTA stations, but only the advertising space within the 
stations. We need not concern ourselves with solicitation or 
leafletting of the public within the stations but only with 
the use of the ad space itself. The nature of this forum is 
partly commercial, consistent with the goal of SEPTA to 
earn a profit on its advertising space and with CBM's offer 
to pay the commercial rate to lease that space. See Airline 
Pilots Assoc. v. Dept. of Aviation of the City of Chicago, 45 
F.3d 1144, 1157 (7th Cir. 1995); Stewart v. District of 
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Columbia Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 
1988). However, SEPTA has also used the advertising space 
to generate a profit through expressive activity. This 
expressive use has not interfered with providing rail 
transportation facilities to the public. Thus, the nature of 
the forum suggests, but by no means establishes, see 
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 
(1974), that the government has dedicated the space to 
expression in the form of paid advertisements. See 
Southeastern Promotions, Limited v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 
555 (1975) (holding municipal theaters were "public forums 
designed for and dedicated to expressive activities"). 
 
With these goals in mind, we next consider SEPTA's 
written policy governing permissible advertising. The 
contract between TDI and SEPTA provides that "it is 
SEPTA's strong preference that [TDI] concentrate on 
securing advertising other than that which is tobacco and 
alcohol related." The contract directs that TDI use its "best 
efforts" to fill the space with other advertisements. 
Recognizing that TDI's responsibility under the contract is 
to "produce revenues," the contract permits the combined 
sale of alcohol and tobacco advertising of up to twenty 
percent of the annual dollar value of the advertising. TDI 
also, however, has an obligation to "pursue qualified public 
health groups, as identified by SEPTA" and to make 
advertising space available to them "on a one to one ratio 
to the tobacco and alcohol related advertising at that time, 
subject to space availability." In addition, the contract 
reserves for SEPTA the right to reject advertisements that it 
does not like: 
 
       All advertising displays at any time inserted or placed 
       by the Licensee in any display devices in any vehicle 
       and /or locations shall be of an appropriate character 
       and quality, and the appearance of all displays shall be 
       acceptable to SEPTA. No libelous, slanderous, or 
       obscene advertising maybe accepted by the Licensee for 
       display in the Authority's transit and railroad vehicles 
       and facilities. All advertising determined by the[sic] 
       SEPTA, in its sole discretion, as objectionable within 
       the meaning of this subsection must not be utilized on 
       any SEPTA vehicle or facility. SEPTA shall have the 
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       right to immediately remove any advertising material 
       which has already been applied, in the event that the 
       [sic] SEPTA deems material objectionable for any 
       reason, at the expense of the Licensee. 
 
SEPTA argues that because it retained the right in its 
sole discretion to reject or to remove any advertisement that 
it deems objectionable, it did not create a public forum of 
any sort. The authority's own statement of its intent, 
however, does not resolve the public forum question. 
Gregoire v. Centennial School District, 907 F.2d 1366, 1374 
(3d Cir. 1990) (reasoning that "intent, as evidenced by a 
government's statements, is a factor to be considered," but 
that "the forum inquiry does not end with the government's 
statement of intent"); see also Air Line Pilots Association, 
Int'l. v. Dept. of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1153-1154 (7th Cir. 
1995); Stewart v. Dist. of Columbia Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 
1013, 1016-1017, 1020 (D.C.Cir. 1988). 
 
Furthermore, the fact that SEPTA has reserved for itself 
the right to reject ads for any reason at all does not signify, 
in and of itself alone, that no public forum has been 
created. See Gregoire, 907 F.2d at 1375. In Gregoire, we 
warned that "standards for inclusion and exclusion" in a 
limited public forum "must be unambiguous and definite" if 
the "concept of a designated open forum is to retain any 
vitality whatever." 907 F. 2d at 1375. We do not hold that 
the government could never, pursuant to an open-ended 
policy of excluding speech as it sees fit, effectively close the 
forum to certain speech (or maintain an entirely closed 
forum) through a consistent practice of so doing. But the 
fact that the government has reserved the right to control 
speech without any particular standards or goals, and 
without reference to the purpose of the forum, does not 
necessarily mean that it has not created a public forum. If 
anything, we must scrutinize more closely the speech that 
the government bans under such a protean standard. See 
Gregoire, 907 F.2d at 1375; id. at 1386 (Stapleton, J., 
dissenting); Denver Area Educational Telecommunications 
Consortium v. FCC, 116 S.Ct. 2374, 2414-2415 (1996) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Lebron, 69 F.3d at 661-662 (Newman, C.J., dissenting). 
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SEPTA's purpose in operating the forum and its written 
policies governing access provide no conclusive answer as 
to whether the forum is intended to be closed or open. The 
goal of generating income by leasing ad space suggests that 
the forum may be open to those who pay the requisite fee. 
SEPTA has specified a few areas in which it will not freely 
accept advertising: alcohol and tobacco advertising beyond 
a specified limit and ads deemed libelous or obscene. These 
restrictions do not apply to the CBM posters. Beyond these 
limitations, there are no specific restrictions on the type of 
advertising that SEPTA will accept. In effect, SEPTA's 
reservation of the right to reject any ad for any reason does 
not conclusively show that it intended to keep the forum 
closed. 
 
We turn now to SEPTA's past practice in using the 
advertising space, and the suitability of the forum to the 
speech in question. 
 
       B. SEPTA's Past Practice and the Suitability of th e 
       Forum for CBM's Ad 
 
SEPTA has accepted a broad range of advertisements for 
display. These include religious messages, such as"Follow 
this bus to FREEDOM, Christian Bible Fellowship Church;" 
an ad criticizing a political candidate; and explicitly worded 
advertisements such as "Safe Sex Isn't" and an 
advertisement reminding viewers that "Virginity-It's cool to 
keep" and "Don't give it up to shut `em up." Indeed, many 
ads address topics concerning sex, family planning, and 
related topics. Other examples include a controversial ad 
campaign on AIDS education and awareness, posters 
stating "The Face of Adoption" "Consider Adoption" and 
"Every child deserves a family," and another ad reading 
"Pregnant? Scared? Confused? A.R.C. Can Help Call 1-800- 
884-4004 or (215-844-1082.)" 
 
On the topic of abortion, SEPTA has accepted two ads. 
One read "Choice Hotline, For Answers to Your Questions 
About: Birth Control * Pregnancy * Prenatal Care * Abortion 
* Adoption * HIV/AIDS * Sexually Transmitted Diseases 
(STDs) Abortion - Making A Decision, Call State Health Line 
1-800-692-7254 For Free Booklet on Fetal Development, 
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Fetus is Latin for Little one - A Little Human is a Baby, 
Confidential * Free." The other one addressed the health 
benefits of legalizing abortion: "When Abortion Was Illegal, 
Women Died. My Mother Was One of Them. Keep Abortion 
Legal and Safe. Support the Clara Bell Duvall Education 
Fund. 471-9110." 
 
From the broad range of ads submitted, SEPTA has 
requested modification of only three. One was the large 
wrap-around bus ad for Haynes hosiery, which would have 
covered the entire bus with the picture of a "scantily clad" 
woman; it was too "risque." The same ad was accepted as 
a smaller "poster" ad on the sides of buses. SEPTA also 
asked for modification of an ad depicting a gun with a 
condom stretched over it. The text of the ad, "Safe Sex 
Isn't," ultimately ran without the graphics. SEPTA also 
requested that an advertisement for a personal injury law 
firm delete references to rail accidents. 
 
We conclude then, based on SEPTA's written policies, 
which specifically provide for the exclusion of only a very 
narrow category of ads, based on SEPTA's goals of 
generating revenues through the sale of ad space, and 
based on SEPTA's practice of permitting virtually unlimited 
access to the forum, that SEPTA created a designated 
public forum. Moreover, it created a forum that is suitable 
for the speech in question, i.e., posters which presented 
messages concerning abortion and health issues. CBM paid 
for advertising space which had previously been used for 
ads on those topics. We need not define the precise 
boundaries of the forum, particularly concerning visual 
images that could be considered explicit. The topic of 
abortion and its health effects were, however, 
"encompassed within the purpose of the forum." Cornelius, 
473 U.S. at 806. 
 
SEPTA argues, however, and the district court concluded, 
that the instances in which SEPTA requested modification 
of ads demonstrate that SEPTA maintained "tight control" 
over the forum. This reasoning is consistent with a number 
of cases, holding that generally when permission is 
necessary before ads are posted, the government has not 
created a public forum. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 47. In this 
case, however, at least 99% of all ads are posted without 
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objection by SEPTA. As we note above, SEPTA has 
exercised control over only three ads, two of which had 
graphics to which SEPTA objected, and one of which 
solicited personal injury cases that could be directed 
against SEPTA. In one case, the concern with the graphics 
was unique to the wrap-around type bus ad -- concerns 
not implicated here. In all three cases, after negotiation 
with the sponsor, the ads were permitted to run with some 
modification. 
 
Because of SEPTA's policy in accepting ads, including 
two on the specific topic in question, the argument that 
SEPTA has "tight control" over the forum may apply to ads 
which are similar to the ones for which SEPTA has required 
modification. That does not mean, however, that such 
control applies to subject matter over which SEPTA has 
never before exercised any restrictions. Because the forum 
may be limited in one way does not foreclose its status as 
a public forum with respect to other categories of speech. If 
it did, there would have been no limited public forum in 
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267, or in Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 
2510. Both cases involved designated fora which excluded 
non-student groups. Nor would there have been a limited 
public forum in Kreimer, where the library constituted a 




5. In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 
116 S.Ct. 2374, 2388 (1996) (plurality opinion), the Court was troubled 
by how to characterize the government's decision to limit a forum to 
exclude certain speech. Does strict scrutiny apply, Justice Breyer asked 
for the plurality, if the government "builds a band shell in the park and 
dedicates it solely to classical music (but not to jazz)?" Justice Kennedy 
responded that the correct analogy to the cable system at issue was "the 
Government's creation of a band shell in which all types of music might 
be performed except rap music," and went on to say that "the provisions 
here are content-based discriminations in the strong sense of 
suppressing a certain form of expression that the Government dislikes, 
or otherwise wishes to exclude on account of its effects, and there is no 
justification for anything by strict scrutiny here." 116 S.Ct. at 2374 
(Justice Kennedy, concurring and dissenting). In this case, the past 
practice of permitting much speech, particularly that on the topic of 
abortion, makes Justice Kennedy's analogy apt. 
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But we reiterate that the government's exercise of some 
restrictions on speech does not foreclose a public forum. 
We do not hold that merely because the government may 
have had a past practice of permitting some expressive 
activity, it has created a public forum. Standing alone, a 
past practice of permitting some expressive activities or 
"limited discourse" does not mandate that the government 
intended the forum as public. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; 
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 720; Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.6 We must 
look at the past practice in conjunction with the purpose of 
the forum. In Cornelius, although the government permitted 
speech in the forum, the "extensive" criteria for admission 
to the forum and the government's purpose in creating the 
forum demonstrated that the government intended the 
forum to be closed. 473 U.S. at 804-805; see also, Kokinda, 
497 U.S. at 730; Perry, 460 U.S. at 47-48. Here, on the 
other hand, the purpose of the forum does not suggest that 
it is closed, and the breadth of permitted speech points in 
the opposite direction. 
 
Moreover, there is no evidence that SEPTA rejected the ad 
pursuant to a new or previously existing policy to close the 
forum to debatable or misleading speech generally, or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Our consideration of the similarity of the speech in question to speech 
permitted in the past is related to a determination of whether the 
limitation constitutes viewpoint discrimination, although here we make 
that inquiry only in conjunction with the other factors in the public 
forum analysis. We do not reach the viewpoint discrimination issue in 
this case. Even if we concluded that no viewpoint discrimination took 
place, however, this would not make the past use of the space irrelevant 
in determining whether the forum is public. How the forum has been 
used in the past is a core component of the public forum inquiry. See, 
e.g., Cornelius at 803-805; see also Denver Area Consortium, 116 S.Ct. 
at 2415 (Kennedy, J. concurring and dissenting) ("It contravenes the 
First Amendment to give Government a general license to single out 
some categories of speech for lesser protection so long as it stops short 
of viewpoint discrimination."). 
 
6. In Kokinda, only four Justices concluded that no public forum had 
been created. Four Justices reached exactly the opposite exclusion -- a 
limited public forum had been created -- based in large part on the past 
practice of permitting speech in the forum. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 750. 
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closed it to such speech on any particular topic of health. 
To the contrary, SEPTA simply argues that the forum was 
closed, and will be closed, to any speech that SEPTA wishes 
to exclude for any reason. In other words, SEPTA does not 
argue that the forum is closed to this particular type of 
speech because SEPTA views it differently from the speech 
it has permitted in the past. Instead, SEPTA claims the 
forum is closed to all speech, and that short of viewpoint 
discrimination, SEPTA can make any content-based 
restrictions it chooses. SEPTA's prior acceptance of a broad 
range of advertisements cuts particularly strongly against 
this claim. Cf. Gregoire, 907 F.2d at 1373. As Justice 
Kennedy reasoned in Denver Area Consortium,"[t]he power 
to limit or redefine forums for a legitimate purpose [citation 
omitted] does not allow the government to exclude certain 
speech or speakers from them for any reason at all." 116 
S.Ct. at 2414 (Kennedy, J.) (concurring and dissenting). 
 
The Seventh Circuit has also concluded, in a case similar 
to this one, that a transportation authority created a 
limited public forum. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago 
Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985). In Planned 
Parenthood, the Chicago Transit Authority ("CTA") refused 
to lease advertising space to Planned Parenthood for display 
of "abortion-related" advertisements. Although CTA had 
rejected an anti-Vietnam war ad (later displayed as part of 
a settlement agreement), and an "Impeach Nixon" placard 
(later displayed pursuant to court order), CTA had accepted 
an anti-war ad depicting "large bombs falling on a child 
releasing a dove with an olive branch in its beak." 767 F.2d 
at 1230. The court concluded that CTA had created a 
limited public forum, reasoning that "CTA maintains no 
system of control over the advertisements that it accepts ... 
other than the general contractual directive .... to refuse 
vulgar, immoral, or disreputable advertising" and that CTA 
"has allowed its advertising space to be used for a wide 
variety of commercial, public-service, public-issue, and 
political ads." Id. at 1232-1233. Noting as well that CTA 
had no policy pursuant to which the ad was excluded, the 
court concluded that the transportation authority had 
created a public forum. We are confronted with a similar 
factual situation in this case, and we reach the same 
conclusion. 
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In arguing to the contrary, SEPTA relies primarily on 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund , 473 
U.S. 788,902 (1985) and Student Coalition for Peace v. 
Lower Merion School, 776 F.2d 431, 436 (3d Cir. 1985). In 
Cornelius, however, the government had a "consistent 
policy," spanning more than two decades, of limiting the 
charity drive to organizations that provided "direct health 
and welfare services to individuals . . .."7 473 U.S. at 793. 
The purpose of the charity drive, moreover, was to limit the 
disruptive effects of individual charity drives throughout the 
year, by "lessening the amount of expressive activity 
occurring on public property." Id. at 805. Here, there is no 
comparable "policy and practice" demonstrating that the 
government intended that the forum be closed to the 
speech at issue in this case. Indeed, the record points 
exactly the other way. In its efforts to generate advertising 
revenues, SEPTA permitted abortion-related and other 
controversial advertisements concerning sexuality. 
 
In Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School, 776 
F.2d 431, 436 (3d Cir. 1985), we considered the refusal of 
a school board to permit a "Peace Fair" on the school's 
athletic field or inside the boys' gymnasium. A student 
organization, not sponsored by the school, which advocated 
a bilateral nuclear freeze, sought to conduct the fair at the 
school. The school had permitted use of the athleticfield for 
a Special Olympics, for a Memorial Day service, for a "Bike 
Hike," and for jogging, picnics, and similar activities. 776 
F.2d at 434. The board rejected the request pursuant to an 
unwritten, but long-standing policy of reserving the athletic 
field for "athletic and governmental purposes." The board 
noted that use of the gym could cause damage to thefloor, 
and offered the use of the auditorium, which the group 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. This policy was in effect from 1963 until 1982. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 
792. During 1982 and 1983, some legal defense funds participated in 
the charity drive under court order. An Executive Order issued in 1983 
limited participation to "voluntary, charitable, health and welfare 
agencies that provide or support direct health and welfare services to 
individuals or their families," excluding "[a]gencies that seek to 
influence 
the outcomes of elections or the determination of public policy through 
political activity or advocacy, lobbying, or litigation on behalf of 
parties 
other than themselves." 473 U.S. at 795. 
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rejected. We concluded, because permission to use the 
facilities in question was not granted "as a matter of 
course" and because the nature of the property suggested 
the facilities did not have as their primary purpose 
expressive activities, that the government had not created a 
limited public forum. Id. at 436-437. The property at issue 
here, on the other hand, has been dedicated to expressive 
activity of exactly the sort in which petitioners seek to 
engage. Moreover, as to the subject of abortion specifically, 
and family planning issues generally, permission to post 
advertisements has been granted as a "matter of course." 
There is no policy, written or unwritten, pursuant to which 
CBM's ads were removed. 
 
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) is 
similarly inapposite. In Lehman, the Court considered a 
ban on political advertising in the city's transit vehicles. A 
candidate for city council challenged the city's rejection of 
his ad pursuant to the city's policy, which had been in 
effect for 25 years. The card space, the Court reasoned, was 
a "commercial venture," and the city was free to limit the 
space to enhance commercial revenues, and to protect 
riders from the "blare of political propaganda." Id. at 303- 
304. As we have made clear, however, SEPTA has no long- 
standing practice of prohibiting ads like CBM's; nor does it 
have any policy pursuant to which the ads were removed. 
SEPTA's past practice is, instead, to include such ads. 
 
Because we find that SEPTA has created a designated 
public forum, content-based restrictions on speech that 
come within the forum must pass strict scrutiny to comport 
with the First Amendment. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. As the 
Supreme Court explained in Police Dept. of the City of 
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92, 95, "above all else, the 
First Amendment means that government has no power to 
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content." Thus the government "may 
not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds 
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less 
favored or more controversial views. And it may not select 
which issues are worth discussing or debating in public 
facilities." Id. at 96. The prohibited expression in this case, 
CBM's ad, falls within the scope of the forum created by 
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SEPTA. Thus, SEPTA's restriction is subject to heightened 
review. 
 
SEPTA has not argued that its actions survive strict 
scrutiny. Accordingly, we conclude that CBM's First 
Amendment rights were violated when SEPTA removed 
CBM's ads. 
 
V. Reasonableness of SEPTA's Restrictions 
 
Even if the speech in question had fallen outside the 
limited public forum created by SEPTA, we would 
nonetheless conclude that SEPTA's removal of the posters 
violated the First Amendment because the removal was not 
"reasonable." When reviewing a governmental agency's 
limitation of speech on government property that has not 
been designated a public forum, the "reasonableness" of 
action limiting speech is gauged with reference to the 
nature of the forum itself. As the Supreme Court explained: 
 
       Consideration of a forum's special attributes is relevant 
       to the constitutionality of a regulation since the 
       significance of the governmental interest must be 
       assessed in light of the characteristic nature and 
       function of the particular forum involved. 
 
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990) 
(plurality opinion) (quoting Heffron v. International Society 
for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); see also, 
Perry, 460 U.S. at 49. The Kokinda plurality went on to 
hold that a ban on solicitation on postal premises was 
reasonable, in part because the "purpose of the forum" was 
"to accomplish the most efficient and effective postal 
delivery system." Id. at 732. Solicitation, the postal service 
had decided, was "inherently disruptive" of its business. Id. 
 
Other cases also make clear that the reasonableness of 
the government's restriction on speech depends on the 
nature and purpose of the property from which it is barred. 
In Kreimer, for example, we considered whether regulations 
governing the behavior of library patrons were reasonable 
by evaluating to what extent the regulations were 
consistent with, or promoted, the purposes to which the 
library had been dedicated. 958 F.2d at 1262. Rules 
limiting disruptive behavior were deemed reasonable 
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because they constituted "perhaps the clearest and most 
direct way to achieve maximum library use." Id; see also, 
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 270, 273 
(1988) (content-based restrictions on speech in school 
newspaper constitutional "so long as [they] are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns"); Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
806 (1985) (distinctions in non-public forum based on 
"subject matter and speaker identity" are constitutional as 
long they are "reasonable in light of purpose served by the 
forum and are viewpoint neutral"); Lee v. Intern. Soc. for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 672, 685 (1992) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (reasonableness inquiry is 
"whether [the restrictions on solicitation and on distribution 
of literature] are reasonably related to maintaining the 
multipurpose environment that the Port Authority has 
created."). 
 
Similarly, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 
298, 303 (1974), the Court considered whether the city's 
refusal to accept political advertising on its rapid transit 
vehicles violated the First Amendment. The Court reasoned 
that 
 
       Revenue earned from long-term commercial advertising 
       could be jeopardized by a requirement that short-term 
       candidacy or issue-oriented advertisements be 
       displayed on car cards. Users would be subjected to 
       the blare of political propaganda. There could be 
       lurking doubts about political favoritism, and sticky 
       administrative problems might arise in parceling out 
       limited space to eager politicians. In these 
       circumstances, the managerial system to limit car card 
       space to innocuous and less controversial advertising 
       does not rise to the dignity of a First Amendment 
       violation. 
 
418 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion). The Court thus 
reasoned that, in order to maximize commercial revenue 
and eliminate concerns about political favoritism, the city 
could restrict the car card space to exclude political 
advertisement. 
 
In this case, the district court concluded that SEPTA 
acted reasonably in relying on Dr. Lee's letter to remove the 
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CBM posters. However, CBM paid the commercial rate for 
the advertising space, just like any other advertiser, and 
submitted an advertisement on abortion and women's 
health, topics that were already the subject of other 
permitted advertisements. The subject of the speech, and 
the manner in which it was presented, were compatible 
with the purposes of the forum. 
 
The plurality opinion in Kokinda warned against 
accepting the argument that simply because the 
government permitted other potentially disruptive speech 
on postal property, it had to permit solicitation as well. The 
Court reasoned that "whether or not the Service permits 
other forms of speech, which may or may not be disruptive, 
it is not unreasonable to prohibit solicitation on the ground 
that it is unquestionably a particular form of speech that is 
disruptive of business." 497 U.S. at 733.8 See also Greer v. 
Spock, 424 U.S. 831, 838 n.10 (1976). In this case, 
however, unlike Kokinda and Lehman, the government has 
offered no basis on which to conclude that the speech in 
question would interfere with the accepted purposes of the 
advertising space. See Lee v. Intern. Soc. for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 672, 691 (1992) (O'Connor, J. 
concurring) ("because I cannot see how peaceful 
pamphletting is incompatible with the multipurpose 
environment of the Port Authority airports, I cannot accept 
that a total ban on that activity is reasonable without an 
explanation as to why such a restriction `preserves the 
property' for the several uses to which it has been put. 
[citation to Perry]"); Airline Pilots Assoc. v. Dept. of Aviation, 
45 F.3d 1144, 1161 (7th Cir. 1995) (Flaum, J. Concurring) 
("...when the government decides who may speak based on 
substantive criteria, it acts as a censor. The government 
should not normally take on the role of deciding who may 
speak on what matters, regardless of what capacity in 
which it acts"). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Although the four Justice plurality concluded that the restriction was 
reasonable, three dissenting Justices concluded that even if the forum 
was nonpublic, the restrictions were not reasonable, in large part 
because the post office permitted other disruptive speech. This 
"inconsistent treatment," in the eyes of the dissent, "renders the 
prohibition on solicitation unreasonable." Kokinda, 497 U.S. 760-761 
(Brennan, J. dissenting). 
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SEPTA argued before the district court that Gambaccini 
had testified that SEPTA "closed the debate to a situation in 
which there are ads or debated and dubious statements of 
medical fact."9 Consistent with this statement, SEPTA could 
have argued that based on Dr. Lee's letter, it viewed CBM's 
ad as "debated and dubious," and accordingly excluded it. 
A prohibition on "debated and dubious ads," put in place 
before, or because of the concerns about CBM's ad, might 
qualify as reasonable. We note, however, that SEPTA does 
not have a policy of protecting riders from "debated and 
dubious" speech generally, nor does SEPTA link this 
purported policy to its use of the forum. 
 
In any event, we need not reach that question. 
Gambaccini did not testify to such a policy, implemented 
either before or after the removal of CBM's ad. Instead, 
when questioned if he would post an ad saying "women 
who choose abortion live longer and have less breast 
cancer," he answered "[N]ot unless there was some credible 
evidence to support it." (Appendix at 354-355). This is a 
different standard -- a debatable advertisement may well be 
supported by credible evidence. And if this standard 
controlled, SEPTA was unreasonable because it failed to 
give CBM an opportunity to produce such evidence. 
Moreover, Gambaccini did not explain whether this 
standard applied generally, or just to ads on the topic of 
abortion and cancer. Nor did he explain SEPTA's grounds 
for adopting it. SEPTA has left us to guess why, in terms of 
the purpose of the forum, it excluded CBM's ad, and why, 
and to what extent, other ads will also be excluded. This 
makes it difficult to evaluate the extent of the governmental 
interest in excluding the speech from SEPTA's property. 
 
Finally, as we have noted, SEPTA never asked CBM-- 
the sponsor of the ad -- to defend its accuracy, to explain 
the basis for the ad, or to clarify it. Instead, SEPTA removed 
the ad without contacting CBM -- even though CBM had 




9. SEPTA argued before us that it "determined not to devote its 
advertising areas to alarming allegations regarding cancer and abortion, 
given the controverted nature of the public health claim as described in 
the HHS letter." 
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We conclude, therefore, that under the facts presented 
SEPTA's actions were not reasonable. SEPTA acted as a 
censor, limiting speech because it found it to be 
"misleading." SEPTA argues that it cannot investigate the 
accuracy of medical claims in ads. For that reason, it relied 
on Dr. Lee's letter. We do not hold that SEPTA must hire its 
own cadre of experts to evaluate medical claims made in 
ads. It was SEPTA, however, which accepted advertising on 
a permitted topic, and then decided that CBM's ad was 
unacceptably misleading. Having decided to exclude the 
posters on this basis, SEPTA did not act reasonably when 
it failed to ask CBM to clarify the basis on which the claim 
was made. This is all the more true where SEPTA has failed 
to explain how its content-based distinctions are related to 
preserving the advertising space for its intended use, and 
where SEPTA has in place no policy, old or new, written or 





For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse district 
court's order granting judgment to SEPTA, and we will 
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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